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Abstract   This paper examines the economic factors that influence output in
the Trinidad and Tobago shrimp fishery using a Generalized Leontief production
function. Factors such as output prices and the use of inputs in the fishery are
assessed. The artisanal and industrial fleets operate in a largely open-access
fishery, which is seasonal. While shrimp is the main targeted species, various
fish species are also targeted using gear modifications. It was found that for the
artisanal shrimp trawl fleet in Trinidad and Tobago, effort, in terms of trip days,
was estimated to have a significant effect on both shrimp and bycatch landings
at almost similar levels. The relative price of the two species was not found to
be significant, and no annual trends in the production of either was observed.
However, the high season for shrimp landings, January to June, was found to
have significant inverse effects on shrimp and bycatch landings.
Key words   Generalized Leontief production function, effort, shrimp, Trinidad
and Tobago.
JEL Classification Codes Q21, Q22, C33.
Introduction
Globally, fish and other seafood products continue to be a major source of protein,
and the demand for these products has risen over time as the world’s population in-
creases and people express preferences for alternative sources of protein that are
perceived as being more healthy. In many parts of the world, fish also provides a
significant source of employment, income, and food security. This is particularly so
in developing countries, where per-capita incomes are low and growth rates of the
national economies are low or even negative. Even as these economies turn to new
sectors for economic growth, the fisheries sector maintains its importance because
of the increasing demand for fish. Further, these resources are often exported as a
source of much needed foreign exchange.
With increasing income and population growth rates in developing countries
relative to developed countries, it is expected that global fish consumption will rise
(Delgado and Courbois 1998). Further, the fisheries sector usually supports whole
communities, from the input suppliers to the fish vendors and processors. In addi-
tion, many developing countries also now view their fish stocks as under-exploited
natural resources, which can be more intensively explored to meet the growing glo-
bal and local demand for fish.
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More and more, fishery managers worldwide have recognized that as entry or
effort controls are increased for one fish species, the bycatch associated with that
fishery may be reduced, but there are often negative unanticipated consequences on
the economic and/or biological health of other targeted fisheries. This is most likely
if the fisheries use similar gear or seasons are complementary. The proper manage-
ment of fisheries worldwide is becoming more and more important because of the
potential for diminished stocks, even to the point of exhaustion. This has significant
costs to the development of society, especially in terms of the loss of economic rent.
Usually the effects are even more tangible through the price system, as the price for
fish rises relative to the price of other meats, which limits food choices. In countries
where per capita incomes are low, this can translate into loss of employment and
livelihoods, as well as limited access to protein by consumers.
Current approaches to managing fisheries today focus on policies which impose
restrictions on gear type, number, and total or individual catches. The implementa-
tion of these policies has met with varied success, but improvements in the
respective fisheries have occurred due to vigilant monitoring and enforcement, as
well as the use of data on the health of fish stocks and fishery inputs and outputs
collected by fishers on a regular basis. These positive outcomes, however, require
sound political, legal, and management institutions, which are usually absent in
many developing countries. However, management of these fisheries cannot be suc-
cessful without understanding, from a qualitative and quantitative way, the
relationships that exist, especially in terms of the kinds of decisions that fishers
make in providing output. Estimations of supply functions have not received signifi-
cant attention in the literature. Even though demand and supply forces interact
together with government regulation to provide price and quantity observations in
the marketplace, it is important to not assume that price is fixed (as is done in sev-
eral bioeconomic models), but to identify the determinants of output from the supply
side (Nøstbakken and Bjørndal 2003).
The aim of this article is to use the production function approach to analyze the
relationship between the harvest of shrimp in Trinidad and Tobago based on aggre-
gate input/output data from 2000–2003. This article is important for the
management of shrimp and other fisheries in the Caribbean region, as well as other
fisheries that face similar institutional restrictions. It uses the Leontief output supply
model and combines the use of effort and relative prices, on a monthly basis, for the
three main kinds of vessels in the shrimp industry. This provides an analysis of the
importance of effort and the price of shrimp bycatch on the level of shrimp landings.
This article first describes the Trinidad and Tobago fisheries by discussing the
evolution of landings of key fish species, fleet structure, and management regula-
tions. The Leontief model is then reviewed. The specification of the model and data
used are described. Results of the analysis is then presented and discussed, followed
by concluding statements.
Fishery Sector of Trinidad and Tobago
The fishing industry is characterized by multi-species, multi-gear fisheries. It is
largely artisanal, but it is also made up of multipurpose vessels and semi-industrial
and industrial trawlers. The most important of the commercial fisheries are reef fish,
coastal pelagics, large pelagics, and shrimp. The pelagic species landed for human
consumption include Serra Spanish mackerel, king mackerel, and tuna.
Between 1994 and 1998, fish and fishery product imports rose from TT$30.7
mil to TT$44.9 mil (US$1=TT$6.3). The contribution of the fisheries sector to GDP
has fallen steadily over time from 0.29% in 1994 to 0.18% in 1999. Trinidad andCaribbean Shrimp Fishery Input Use: Case Study 347
Tobago is made up of two islands in the Southern Caribbean (figure 1). While the
two islands are constitutionally one, the fisheries are separately managed at the local
level. In general, the fisheries are viewed as largely open-access resources.
Vessel registration is required by law. In 2003, there were 830 vessels operating
in Trinidad’s fisheries. However, unlike vessel registration, fisher registration is not
required by law. Therefore, in 2002 there were an estimated 3,500 fishers in the in-
dustry, but only 538 were registered.
Shrimp Fishery
Due to an increase in revenue per capita coupled with drastic development of the
tourist trade, there has been an increased demand for shrimp in some Caribbean is-
lands, such as Trinidad and Tobago. From 1953 to present day, the shrimp industry
in Trinidad has evolved considerably. Prior to 1953, the beach seine was the main
gear used. However, after 1953, due to the lack of efficiency of this gear type, in
terms of both time and landings, the otter trawl was introduced. Between 1966 and
1969, there was a significant increase in artisanal trawlers (using nets that were re-
trieved manually) from 66 to 166, contributing to the genesis of the Demersal Trawl
Fishery of Trinidad and Tobago. This fishery predominantly targeted white shrimp
(Litopenaeus schmiti) off the Southwest Coast of Trinidad, which comprises the
Gulf of Paria and inshore waters of the Orinoco Delta on the coast of Venezuela.
Figure 1. Location Map of Trinidad and Tobago
Source: Petrotrin (2007).Hutchinson 348
In 1977, the governments of Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela implemented
an agreement in which 60 Trinidadian artisanal trawlers were allowed to access the
inshore areas of the Delta from December to June each year. In 1985, an additional
10 artisanal trawlers were allowed to access this area; however, all entry was denied
by 1995. In 1997, a new reciprocal Fishing “Cooperation” Agreement with Venezu-
ela again allowed access to Venezuelan water outside two miles from the coast.
However, ongoing conflicts among fishers and the Coast Guards of both countries
resulted in underutilized access (Kuruvilla et al. 2000).
In the shrimp fishery, a significant amount of finfish bycatch is harvested. Some
of this finfish may be targeted based on market demand, or from July to December
when shrimp abundance falls (Maharaj, Ferreira, and Lum Young 1992). Trawlers
are categorized based on vessel size and the level of mechanization. In 1979, there
were 24 industrial trawlers, and shrimp exports expanded primarily to the U.S.A.
There are two inshore, artisanal fleets, one near-shore semi-industrial fleet and one
industrial fleet. In 2000, the shrimp fleet was comprised of 114 vessels. Characteris-
tics of these vessels are given in table 1.
All types of trawlers operate on the West Coast throughout the year, primarily
from May to August. The next main fishing area is off the South Coast of Trinidad
in the Columbus Channel. Since this area lies between Trinidad and Venezuela, Ven-
ezuelan trawlers predominantly exploit it (Kuruvilla, Ferreira, and Soomai 2000).
Since shrimp move from estuaries as juveniles and slowly migrate to deeper water,
the inshore artisanal and off-shore semi-industrial fleets harvest the shrimp at vari-
ous stages in their life cycle (Kuruvilla et al. 2000). Therefore it is important to
assess any changes in the effort, landings, and the relationship between these two
elements of the fishery for each type of fleet.
Table 1
Characteristics and Size of the Trinidad Shrimp Trawl Fleet
Number of Number of
Average Vessel Trawlers Trawlers
Vessel Type Horsepower Length (m) Gear Type (1991) (1998)
I - Artisanal 2 × 56 6.7 – 9.8 1 stern trawl 113 13
Outboard manually
retrieved
II - Artisanal 137 7.9 – 11.6 1 stern trawl 66 71
Inboard manually
retrieved
III - Semi- 176 10.4 – 12.2 1 stern trawl 9 9
industrial Inboard retrieved by
diesel hydraulic
winch




Total Vessels 209 114
Source: Modified from Kuruvilla, Ferreira, and Soomai (2000) and Chan A Shing (1999). The number of
semi-industrial and industrial vessels is for 2000.Caribbean Shrimp Fishery Input Use: Case Study 349
Management
The main species of shrimp harvested are: brown (Farfantepenaeus subtilis); white
(Litopenaeus schmiti); pink (F. notialis); honey or seabob (Xiphopenaeus), and red-
spotted (F. brasiliensis). For all shrimp species, the stock is overexploited, so that
the stock biomass is in decline. In addition, recent assessments of the Southern pink
shrimp (Farfantepenaeus notialis) and Atlantic seabob (Xiphopenaeus kroyeri) fish-
eries indicated that the semi-industrial and artisanal fleets that operate in the
Southern Gulf of Paria harvest a significant proportion of juvenile shrimp (Ferreira
and Medley 2005)
In 1998, no new trawlers were allowed to enter the fishery; however, this law
had limited implementation for only the industrial fleet (Kuruvilla et al. 2000). Fish-
ing is permitted in different zones based on the fleet type. However, there is
significant overlap in the areas fished by the semi-industrial and industrial vessels in
the main fishing area off the West Coast (Kuruvilla, Ferreira, and Soomai 2000).
There is a minimum mesh size for the cod-end of the trawl for fish and shrimp, and
the use of turtle excluder devices is required by the semi-industrial and industrial
fleets. Registered fishers or vessel owners receive Value Added Tax (VAT) exemp-
tion on equipment, engine parts, and new fishing vessels. In addition, registered
vessel owners who wish to replace their vessels are eligible for a subsidy of 25% of
the purchase cost of pirogues to a maximum of TT$5,000. However, the original
vessel is required to be removed from the fishery (MALMR 2007). Registered ves-
sel owners are also eligible to access subsidies on gasoline and oil, but these are
minimal.
From 1996 to 2005, shrimp landings accounted for an average of 8.8% of all
fishery landings (figure 2), and 21.0% of revenue earned annually (figure 3). Over-
all, the share of landings has fallen from 11.9% in 1996 to 7.0%. Shrimp’s share of
total revenue declined almost steadily since 1997 from 30% to 16.6%. In 2005, total
shrimp landings were 778.67 tonnes, valued at approximately US$3.4 million.
Kuruvilla, Ferreira, and Soomai (2000) reported that between 1995-1998,
shrimp exports to the U.S.A. fell significantly and were eventually banned in 1999,
since many fishers did not comply fully with U.S. laws, including those pertaining
with the use of turtle excluder devices in trawl nets. As an economy, Trinidad and
Tobago is presently blocked from exporting wild shrimp to the U.S.A.
The shrimp stock found in Trinidad and Tobago is shared in the Brazil-Guianas
Shelf. Therefore, trawling activities in neighboring countries along the northeast
coast of South America affects the Trinidad and Tobago fishery (CFRAMP 1997). To
assist with management, various stock assessments and bio-economic models of the
shrimp species found in Trinidad and Tobago were carried out in the last 15 years.
An evaluation of the shared shrimp stocks between Trinidad and Tobago and Ven-
ezuela, by the FAO/WECAFC in 2002 indicated the cost per unit of effort (CPUE)
for F. subtilis fell by 75% between 1970–2002, with a similar decline for P.
brasiliensis. This, together with other information, indicated that both of these
dominant shrimp species were severely overfished (Die et al. 2004). Prior stock as-
sessments of P. subtilis and P. schmitti done in 1990–1991 (CFRAMP 1997) and for
P. subtilis in 1997 by the WECAFC Ad Hoc Shrimp and Groundfish Working Group
(FAO/WECAFC 2001), also indicated that these resources were fully to over-ex-
ploited and that effort should not increase above the 1996 levels (FAO/WECAFC
2001).
In addition, the stock of F. notialis and X. kroyeri were also considered to be
fully exploited and overfished, respectively, and that very immature, and hence very
small, shrimp were being captured (CRFM 2005). A precautionary approach to man-
agement was recommended based primarily on a reduction in fleet size and laterHutchinson 350
Figure 2. Share of Landings for Major Species in Trinidad and Tobago, 1996–2005
Source: Fisheries Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Marine Resources, Trinidad and Tobago.
Figure 3.  Share of Total Revenue by Major Species for Trinidad and Tobago, 1996–2005Caribbean Shrimp Fishery Input Use: Case Study 351
supported by a call to introduce closed seasons by countries in the Brazil-Guianas
Shelf (FAO/WECAFC 2002).
Methods
Production functions used to establish the determinants of landings are varied. Re-
cent work has included the use of Cobb-Douglas production functions, where
production relies on effort and the stock biomass (Eide et al. 1998; García del Hoyo
and Chacón 1998). However, the Cobb-Douglas form imposes restrictions on the un-
derlying relationships, such as production elasticity, on substitution possibilities and
on the separability of inputs (García del Hoyo and Chacón 1998). More recently, re-
search that assesses the determinants of fish landings has looked at the nature and
strength of linkages that exist among fisheries, especially for species that are landed
together or at different times of the year by the same group of fishers. This work has
primarily used a dual revenue function approach. In the U.S.A., this approach has
been used extensively in the U.S. Pacific sablefish and thornyhead fisheries (Squires
and Kirkley 1996 and references cited therein) and the New England otter trawl in-
dustry, which targets cod, yellowtail, haddock, redfish, and pollock (Squires 1988).
The dual approach has also been used to estimate fishery behavior in Australia’s multi-
species southeast trawl fishery, which lands about 100 commercial fish species (Bose,
Campbell, and McIlgorm 2000) and in the Mauritanian (Sahara, West Africa) cepha-
lopod fishery, which is dominated by octopus (Diop and Kazmierczak 1995).
Production technologies used to harvest different species that share inputs are
characterized as having jointness-in-inputs, which indicates that changes in the price
or level of inputs used in one fishery affect the supplies of other species. It is also
possible that there is no direct relationship between any input and output (Kirkley
and Strand 1988).
Despite regulations, however, Dupont (1990) found that rent is still dissipated
(i.e., uncaptured) from input substitution, fleet redundancy, and/or inefficient fleet
composition. For example, regulated inputs (e.g., mesh size) are replaced by unregu-
lated inputs (e.g., labor and vessel horsepower). This substitution lowers the catch
per unit associated with the additional capital so that the potential gains in effi-
ciency (such as would result from market-induced input substitution or an efficient
regulation) are lost by the increased costs resulting from overcapitalization.
Previous studies have used dual production functions to describe the behavior of
firms landing multiple species. These production functions have been derived from
profit or revenue functions. Using a “flexible” functional form, which is a second-
order differentiable approximation to an unknown function (Blackorby and Diewert
1979), is preferred since it does not limit the values of the substitution elasticities
(Greene 1997). Commonly used flexible functional forms for multispecies modeling
include the translog (García del Hoyo and Chacón 1998; Thunberg, Bresnyan, and
Adams 1995), quadratic (Dupont 1990), and generalized Leontief (Kirkley and
Strand 1988; Squires and Kirkley 1995). In multispecies fishery studies that use the
dual production function approach, one input use measure is usually fishing effort.
Moreover, several researchers have used a “composite input” (a weighted combina-
tion of key inputs) as a proxy for all other variable inputs used in the short run.
A nonhomothetic Leontief functional form was selected for this study because it
has an advantage of using the data in levels (as opposed to revenue shares), and it
automatically imposes linear homogeneity in prices (Squires and Kirkley 1995):
R(P,E,D) = Σ Σ Σ Σ ΣkΣ Σ Σ Σ ΣiΣ Σ Σ Σ Σj βij
k (PiPj)1/2Ek + Σ Σ Σ Σ ΣkΣ Σ Σ Σ ΣnΣ Σ Σ Σ Σi βi
k PiEkEn + Σ Σ Σ Σ ΣkΣ Σ Σ Σ ΣmΣ Σ Σ Σ ΣlΣ Σ Σ Σ Σi αil
mkDl
mPiEk, (1)Hutchinson 352
where R is the total revenue per month, P is the unit ex-vessel price of outputs i,j
(US$/kg), and k,n are the various types of effort (or restricted input), E. Index l rep-
resents the categories for each dummy variable, m, for the years 2000-2002 and the
months of January-November.
The restricted revenue function [equation (1)] was then transformed via
Hotelling’s Lemma (Diewert 1971) to obtain a system of input-compensated output
supply functions:
δR(P,E,D)/δPi = Σk βii
k Ek + Σ Σ Σ Σ Σk Σ Σ Σ Σ Σj≠i βij
k (Pj/Pi)1/2 Ek (2)
+ Σ Σ Σ Σ ΣkΣ Σ Σ Σ Σn βi
k EkEn + Σ Σ Σ Σ ΣkΣ Σ Σ Σ ΣmΣ Σ Σ Σ Σl αil
mkDl
mEk.
Since only trip days was used as the measure of effort, the estimable output sup-
ply equation for shrimp and bycatch was:
Qi = βii E + βij (Pj/Pi)1/2 E + βi E2 + Σ Σ Σ Σ ΣmΣ Σ Σ Σ Σl αil
m Dl
mE, (3)
where Q represents the quantity of outputs landed (kg). Following estimation, the
parameters were used to calculate own- and cross-price elasticities of supply and de-
mand. These elasticities were used to identify substitute or complementary
relationships among the outputs. The calculation of cross-price elasticites can be
used to determine the level of redirection of effort that may occur if relative prices
change (Roderick, Adams, and Taylor 1995). Given the output supply specified in

















































A priori it is expected that own-price elasticities are positive, reflecting an incentive
to increase supplies if faced with higher prices. Similarly, the cross-price elasticities













































i.e., all βij’s are simultaneously restricted to a zero value.































All data were obtained from the Fisheries Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Land
and Marine Resources, Trinidad and Tobago. Landings and effort data for all fish
species are normally collected in the fishery on a sample basis. For at least 20 ran-Caribbean Shrimp Fishery Input Use: Case Study 353
dom days each month, all trip data is collected at just over one quarter of all landing
sites. This data is then used to estimate total trip data (Lalla 2002). The data used in
this paper were provided on a monthly basis for all commercial fishers that landed
shrimp from 2000–2003. These data included quantity of shrimp and other species
(bycatch) landed in live weight (kg), the ex-vessel price (TT$/kg), and the number
of trip days per month. Disaggregated data on landings of non-shrimp species were
not available. Landings and effort data was divided according to the fleet type:
artisanal, semi-industrial, and industrial.
Since the supply equations are derived from a common function, it is possible
the error terms are correlated. Therefore, we would expect E(εiε′ j) = σijIM, where σij
is the covariance of the disturbances of the ith and jth output equations. This covari-
ance represents the only link between the ith and jth outputs. Because this link is
subtle, the system of output supply equations is considered a system of “seemingly
unrelated regression” (SUR) equations (Kmenta 1997), with symmetry imposed; i.e.,
βij = βji. Each quarterly system of equations was therefore estimated simultaneously
in EViews“ using Zellner’s Iterated SUR technique.
Results and Discussion
Table 2 summarizes the average monthly landings for shrimp and bycatch during the
study period. For all fleet types, mean monthly shrimp landings showed some vari-
ability, but overall they were stable over time. In contrast, for the artisanal and
semi-industrial fleets, the mean unit shrimp price fell steadily from 2000–2003 by
17 and 12%, respectively (table 3). This fall in unit prices may have been due to a
decline in the international price for shrimp from 2000–2003, but was opposite to
the general rise in the price of food experienced locally, at the rate of 8.3, 13.9,
10.2, and 13.8% in each of the study years, respectively (CBTT 2001, 2003, 2004).
The decline in mean ex-vessel price could have also been caused by the landings of
a larger proportion of smaller shrimp, which fetch a lower price. Even though the
unit price of shrimp increased from 2000–2001 for the industrial fleet, a similar
drop occurred thereafter, with similar implications. This reduction in ex-vessel
shrimp price was supported by the various stock assessments of the main shrimp
species in the fishery, concluding that the shrimp stocks were fully to overexploited
(CRFM 2005; CFRAMP 1997; Die et al. 2004; FAO/WECAFC 2001, 2002).
Further, the pressure on these fisheries appears to be increasing given the continued
Table 2
Mean Monthly Landings of the Shrimp Trawl Sample, 2000–2003 (kg)
Artisanal Semi-industrial Industrial
Shrimp Bycatch Shrimp Bycatch Shrimp Bycatch
2000 24,936 20,321 9,873 23,908 35,921 26,991
2001 32,489 15,125 10,526 21,094 34,894 33,173
2002 25,725 11,984 9,556 23,651 43,052 48,104
2003 24,698 11,984 9,858 20,300 32,049 35,632
Average 26,962 14,854 9,953 22,238 36,479 35,975
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Marine Resources (2007).Hutchinson 354
non-implementation of recommendations to reduce the fleet size and introduce sea-
son closures. The effects are being reflected in the market price.
The artisanal fleet, which accounts for the majority of vessels in the entire fish-
ery, experienced a steady decline in the average number of trip days from
2001–2003 by almost 34% (table 4). This effort reduction has been partially offset
by a 33% rise in mean monthly trips days in the semi-industrial fleet over the same
period. No trends were observed for the industrial fleet effort. The artisanal and
semi-industrial fleets exhibited very similar patterns of CPUE over the entire sample
period (figure 4), but there was no discernable trend in the efficiency of effort over
time for these fleets, or the industrial fleet.
The estimated parameters from the output supply equations [equation (3)] are
presented in table 5. The base level of dummy variables represents fishing in De-
Table 3
Mean Monthly Prices of the Shrimp Trawl Sample, 2000–2003 (US$/kg)
Artisanal Semi-industrial Industrial
Shrimp Bycatch Shrimp Bycatch Shrimp Bycatch
2000 4.46 0.67 4.82 0.74 3.94 0.85
2001 4.20 0.61 4.81 0.71 4.27 0.79
2002 3.88 0.59 4.70 0.69 4.10 0.83
2003 3.68 0.58 4.22 0.70 3.81 0.78
Average 4.05 0.61 4.64 0.71 4.03 0.81
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Marine Resources (2007).
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Table 4
Mean Monthly Number of Trip Days of the Shrimp Trawl Sample, 2000–2003
Artisanal Semi-industrial Industrial
2000 567 184 314
2001 646 218 348
2002 483 241 479
2003 428 245 315
Average 531 222 364
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Marine Resources (2007).
cember, 2003. For the artisanal, semi-industrial, and industrial fleets, approximately
40, 34, and 11% of the parameters, which are asymptotically equivalent to maximum
likelihood estimates, were significant at the 5% level. For the artisanal fleet, every
additional trip day was estimated to increase shrimp landings by approximately 53
kg per month and bycatch landings by approximately 50 kg per month. Even though
the additional landings may appear small, what is noteworthy is that almost the
same amount of bycatch is estimated to be landed as shrimp. However, as effort in-
creases in the fishery, the rate of change in shrimp landings is expected to fall, but
only by a minimal amount.
The coefficient on the relative price variable for both outputs was not signifi-
cant, which suggests that fishers are not responding to relative price changes in
these fisheries. This is counterintuitive in this fishery, where fishers have indicated
that the trawl gear is modified in some cases to target finfish which may have a sea-
sonal high value. For the various years, only the 2000 dummy variable was
significant for both the shrimp and bycatch supply functions, which suggests that
overall there are no annual trends in landings of these species. For the monthly dum-
mies, the coefficients for the months of January to June were significant for both
output models in the artisanal fleet. This coincides exactly with the high season for
shrimp in Trinidad, and therefore was as expected. While there is expected to be in-
creases in shrimp landings during this high season, the landings of bycatch, as
estimated by the model, were expected to fall for those months for every additional
unit of effort expended by this fleet. The most important month for shrimp was
March. In this month, every additional unit of effort was estimated to increase
shrimp landings by almost 46 kg. In contrast, that same additional effort was ex-
pected to have a negative impact on bycatch landings, which should fall by 11 kg.
Own-price elasticities for both shrimp and bycatch in the artisanal and semi-in-
dustrial fleets had the positive expected signs (table 6). However, in these fleets, the
landings of both shrimp and bycatch were largely inelastic. For the artisanal fishers,
a 1% increase in the price of shrimp was expected to cause only a 0.02% rise in
shrimp landings, and a 1% rise in the price of bycatch was expected to cause only a
0.24% rise in bycatch landings.
In general, the cross-price relationships suggested that fishers were more re-
sponsive to changes in the price of shrimp, versus changes in the price of bycatch.
This is expected given that the average unit price of shrimp during the sample pe-
riod is almost five and a half times larger than that of bycatch. However, the
responses were still very inelastic.
The effort elasticities, which measure the effects on landings of a unit change in
trip days, are shown in table 7 for fishing in each fleet in January of 2003. TheseHutchinson 356
Table 5
Estimated Parameters of the Output Supply Equations
Outputs (Dependent Variables)
Artisanal Semi- Industrial
Independent Fleet  industrial Fleet Fleet
Variables Shrimp Bycatch Shrimp Bycatch Shrimp Bycatch
Effort, βii 53.08* 50.36* 25.88 154.43* 113.60* 59.46
(6.615) (13.155) (16.040) (51.608) (27.092) (63.285)
Effort –0.02* –0.01 0.06 –0.10 –0.05 –0.08
squared, βi, (0.012) (0.012) (0.049) (0.148) (0.059) (0.068)
Output prices, βij:
Shrimp SYMMETRIC SYMMETRIC SYMMETRIC
bycatch –5.28 –18.43 38.74
(4.767) (20.855) (24.581)
Dummy  Variables, ail
m:
2000 –7.10* 9.94* 17.31* 45.73* 8.30 –24.62
(3.109) (3.116) (4.492) (13.442) (10.810) (12.446)
2001 –1.83 –2.09 8.61* 16.48 –1.64 –16.25
(3.324) (3.331) (3.286) (9.984) (10.487) (12.347)
2002 –3.45 –2.11 –0.87 18.37* –5.75 1.05
(2.795) (2.804) (2.768) (8.258) (12.734) (14.609)
Jan. 22.12* –6.72 18.63* 9.72 50.18* –15.66
(4.382) (4.772) (5.597) (17.738) (19.679) (23.920)
Feb. 43.26* –8.77 26.11* –11.29 –10.41 –6.50
(4.425) (5.513) (5.560) (17.358) (17.280) (20.417)
Mar. 45.63* –11.22* 26.05* –12.06 –7.41 20.77
(4.420) (4.980) (5.643) (17.708) (15.597) (17.870)
Apr. 29.97* –6.76 23.11* 1.43 –6.01 –4.11
(4.296) (4.533) (5.633) (16.297) (17.009) (19.482)
May 25.41* –4.41 22.01* –9.48 –19.93 –4.35
(4.290) (4.313) (5.510) (15.799) (15.798) (18.162)
Jun. 9.69* –6.82 15.53* –7.63 –18.55 –16.15
(4.426) (4.465) (5.370) (15.557) (16.481) (19.585)
Jul. 6.83 –8.67 –4.76 15.93 –25.89 –12.48
(4.341) (4.399) (5.377) (15.381) (16.034) (20.480)
Aug. 6.34 –11.09* –19.59* 12.97 –46.00* –1.23
(4.374) (4.669) (5.502) (17.714) (16.679) (20.907)
Sep. 1.68 –11.43* –7.59 –15.07 –32.02* –24.41
(4.490) (4.543) (5.487) (17.079) (15.870) (19.771)
Oct. 0.27 –7.74 0.11 –26.34 –3.73 –33.58
(4.407) (4.537) (5.525) (16.126) (16.069) (18.675)
Nov. –1.08 7.97 –3.89 10.36 –7.64 –14.75
(4.428) (4.454) (5.488) (15.879) (17.114) (19.710)




Shrimp 1.02 1.43 1.44
Bycatch 0.69 0.73 0.73
elasticities can be computed for any time period, but 2003 was presented here as it
represents the most recent study year. Across all fleets, the high season for shrimp
landings is from January to June. These elasticities were computed using the vari-
able monthly means for the entire sample period.
For all fleets, effort elasticites for shrimp were elastic, while those for bycatch
were inelastic. For every 1% increase in trip days, it is expected that shrimp land-
ings will increase by 1.44 and 1.02% in the industrial and artisanal fleets,
respectively. The semi-industrial and industrial fishers reported almost identical re-
sponsiveness.
Overall, the use of monthly price and landings data over four years, together
with seasonal dummy variables, were included to provide an assessment of the intra-
and inter-year variability in the prices of shrimp and bycatch on landings. However,
the mixed outcomes of the models, in terms of the significance of the annual dum-
mies and the relative prices, may have been due to the relatively short time series
used. This, therefore, suggests that the results are valid only within the range of
landings and prices of the sample data. Further, the inclusion of a longer data time
series may provide variations in the estimated parameters if the behavior of fishers
has changed significantly from that observed during the study period.
Concluding Remarks
The estimated model suggests that, as expected, the behavior of the different fleet
types in the Trinidad and Tobago shrimp fishery is varied. Changes in the nominal
prices obtained for the different fleets suggest that fishers may be harvesting
smaller, less valuable shrimp over time. Effort is seen as an important determinant
in the overall landings of both shrimp and bycatch. While normally seen in a nega-
tive way, shrimp fishers are landing significant portions of bycatch and will land
even more bycatch as effort increases. The relative price elasticities of shrimp and
Table 6
Own and Cross-Price Elasticities
jth Species
Artisanal Semi-industrial Industrial
ith Species Shrimp Bycatch Shrimp Bycatch Shrimp Bycatch
Shrimp 0.02 –0.02 0.08 –0.08 –0.09 0.09
Bycatch –0.24 0.24 –0.24 0.24 0.44 –0.44Hutchinson 358
bycatch do not appear to have any impact on the landings of either species. This is
contrary to anecdotal evidence in the fishery, which suggests that fishers modify
their gear as the price of finfish increases relative to the price of shellfish.
Other factors in the fishery, such as the importance of bycatch to the local fish-
ing community and the poor success in managing entry into the fishery, also have a
great potential impact on the incentives fishers face in determining their landings.
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